CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Saudi Arabia is one of the most religious states in the world which has successfully combined the state (dawla), religion (din), and princes (umara) (Teitelbaum & Pipes 2001). The country has thrived on the arrangement between the royals and the religious clerics. The Al-Saud royal family provides funding and a stable structure of government which allowed the growth of a conservative religion throughout the nation, while the clerics provided the government with the religious legitimacy to rule (Teitelbaum & Pipes 2001) . The arrangement made it possible to have an authoritarian regime that uses the nation’s wealth to the favour of only the royal family. Clerics legalize all action made by the authoritarian regime even though unjustified. Arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearance were legalized by clerics as the Royals’ right to protect citizens which completely contradict with Islamic teaching. Detaining thousands of people for more than six months, in some cases for over a decade, without referring them to courts for criminal proceedings (Justice 2008) . Arbitrary detainees held for very long periods has obviously increased dramatically in recent years. Cleric Salman AlOudah has been detained since 1^st September 2017 without a legal charge or indictment and was not brought to the court. It was not only the Islamists who were exposed to such violations but the intellectuals and human rights activists. The clerics were free to enforce Sharia in the country, and the Royals were free to run the wealth and affairs of the country. However, as the Saudi state grew and started embracing modernism, some changes were made, and this revealed subordination of clergy to the Royals at the expense of religion. The Royals welcomed some western ways, and this foreign influence should be rejected by the clerics (Kostiner 1996) . The royal family now is fully controlling the clerics. Conflicts arose as a result of this modernization of the country in that; the clerics support the reforms implemented by the state. Accordingly, official religious establishment became part of the government and worked in line with. The royal family wanted a more centralized system of government while citizens keen to huge reform away from the authoritarian regime.

Security grip is a royal way to keep interests and stay in power. It is impossible to talk about pluralism nor political participation as that can be conceded as disobedience of the royals and Islam teaching.  In the meantime, all opposition forces are calling for democracy, pluralism and political participation. Citizens are also seeking change not calling for dropping the royals but by calling for constitutional monarchy. Citizens and opposition forces believe in the political reform which obviously unacceptable to the Royals. Therefore, citizens’ perceptions are important for more understanding the needed reform. 

Saudi Arabia government approved a huge shift when prince Mohammed Bin Salman appointed as crown prince on June 21, 2017 (Barnell 2017). The new crown prince has made a number of exciting reforms, such allowing women to drive, opening cinema halls and performing concerts. Unfortunately, political reforms were not part of the crown prince’s plan. Furthermore, the crown prince has embarrassed the Wahhabi religious establishment as all his reforms contradict their approach. 

Crown prince Mohammed Bin Salman stated that Saudi authority adopted Wahhabism as requested by western states to stop the Communist expansion in the late 1970s (DeYoung 2018). The statement can be considered as a coup against the religious establishment which has been silent. Opposition forces welcomed the statement as it removes the authority religious legitimacy that violates rights and confiscates freedoms.  

CHAPTER TWO

Literature

The opposition in Saudi Arabia can be traced back to the early 1930s. Prior to this period, the Islamic rules were practised in accordance with the Wahhabi creed. These principles laid the basis of the Saudi expansion as an enforcer of the sharia law. The laws were used as a moral compass to guide the actions of the citizens. After the establishment of a state that was more centralized than decentralized, individuals and groups resisted the control from the state. A dispute later arose between Abd al- ‘Aziz Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman (Ibn Sa’ud), the Saudi leader at that time, and a number of tribal groups, the Ikhwan, who were loyal to the religion and resisted being under the control of the government. Fierce disagreements arose between the leading clerics and the royals. In the 1930s, the king, Ibn Sa’ud made the Wahhabi Islam the official state religion. Only the senior clerics had supreme religious authority. This meant that all the other clerics could only conduct their affairs within the religious framework put in place by the king. He also made state interest superior to the religious interests (Matthiesen 2015) .

The Wahhabi Islam became the only moral guide in the state. However, they were only allowed to operate in accordance with the interests of the state. The clerics were limited to guiding the behaviour of the public, educating individuals, and preaching. They could not take part in governing the state. The state was run by the royals and the elite clerics. The Ikhwan tribal groups which opposed the king’s control over the people lost the battle in between 1929 and 1930 after a military help from Great Britain to King Abdulaziz. They were not able to spread their ideologies. They remained underground, and their ideas were adopted by various other opposition movements over time. The opposition in Saudi Arabia came to be as a result of people resisting change and state control (Meijer, Aarts, Wagemakers, & Kanie 2012) .

After the Second Gulf War, the opposition continued to grow. The opposition groups and individuals in this era had slightly different grievances. When the Saudi military was unable to defend the country, and the U.S military troops were called in to help, most of the people criticized the state. The royal family was seen as weak and incompetent leaders. The opposition groups that developed in this period were determined to end the reign of the royal family. There was a public outcry when the non-Muslim troops came into the country. The presence of the foreign troops in the state led to the opinion that the royal family held foreign interests in high esteem. The opposition criticized the royals as being keener on protecting the interests of outsiders (Teitelbaum & Pipes 2001) .

In the years 1991-2001, the activities of the opposition were restricted by the state. Outspoken individuals who challenged the royals were imprisoned or detained without a trial (Teitelbaum & Pipes 2001). The opposition groups such as the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia started operating outside Saudi Arabia to avoid being persecuted. Most of the opposition leaders used London as a base of operations. They were able to reach their supporters through the internet and the media without facing any repression from the royal family.  The grievances and issues addressed were the same throughout the 1990s. Both the radicals and the liberals agreed on the issue of foreign interference (Jenkinsc 2017) .

Their oppositions have grown ever since despite the constant repression from the Saudi government. The opposition in Saudi Arabia is similar to other movements in the Middle East except for the fact that the Saudi opposition derives from the Wahhabi school of thought in that, they have their interpretation of the Sharia that they use to challenge state control as being unlawful. Some of the religious ideologies of the modern opposition and activism correspond with some of the ideas from the West, and as a result, they can influence the modern middle-class individuals (Matthiesen 2015) explain the assertion – democracy- pluralism- human rights principles. The Saudi oppositions accept and call for democracy, political participation, and pluralism that denied by Wahhabism. It is easier for them to influence the educated people since they purport to seek to address a modern issue such as corruption, human rights violations, among other things. Even though some of the oppositions have clear objective sand structures, they are at risk or becoming ineffective due to the measures were taken by the Saudi government and other interested parties in repressing opposition. This means that even though most of these oppositions exist and have a lot of influence, their activities are quashed even before they become established. 

The Theory of Saudi Arabia Political Opposition

All political oppositions fighting the authoritarian regime and call for democracy but under Islamic rules (sharia law).  It is common for the opposition parties in Saudi Arabia to uses the language of Islamic laws, to accuse the government of breaching the holy law by neglecting Islamic goals and deviating from Islamic practices in the administrative, economic and political affairs. The opposition party also suggests alternatives to the existing government based on the Islamic Sharia laws. The radical Islamic opposition movement such as the Tajdeed Islamic Party (Islamic Renewal party) questions theexisting state order by giving its own interpretation of Wahhabi Islam.

Liberalism enjoys a global victory in some sense, and it is perceived to perpetuate the ideals of political liberties or free trade to maximize individual freedom best. However, the opposition in Saudi Arabia believes in liberalism but under Islamic rules (not pure liberalism). The opposition in the country does not advocate a strictly secular state. The opposition is against a West’s spiritually vacant secular culture but instead want a liberal democracy’s based on divine authority. While the opposition supports most of the liberal democracies including popular elections and economic modernization, God’s sovereignty is central to the opposition politicians. The political opposition tends to align their politics with a righteous society with the precepts of shari’a; spiritualism rationalized in the technocratic ways they use to rise against the government and its absolute authority.
While the Political oppositions call for Pluralism as they believe in the need for political parties and institutions of civil society, but they support the activities of the groups should be based on their interpretation of the Islamic law.  Interpretation of the Islamic law differs from one group to another, but that does not change the nature of the liberalism they want to see in the country.

The Islamic Umma Party.

          The Islamic Umma Party is regarded as the first opposition political party in Saudi Arabia. It had defied the order that forbade the existence of political parties in Saudi Arabia. The party came into being after nine Saudi scholars, and political activists came together to fight for political reforms. The party was made public on February 9^th, 2011. Unlike other organizations that came before and after it, it had a very organized structure with leaders and a well spelled out (Alsalem 2011) .

            After the party was formed, the officials of the party made invitations to activists who shared the same opinions to join them. As a result of this announcement, the founding members of the party were arrested and detained on 16^th February that same year. The detainees included; Dr Ahmed bin Sa’ad bin Gharm al-Ghamidi who was a professor at Umm al-Qura University, Mr Sa’ud bin Ahmed al-Dughaithir a political activist, Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin Muhammad al-Wuhaybi; a lawyer and political activist; Dr Abdul Kareem bin Yusuf al-Khidhr who was a university professor, Shaykh Muhammad bin Hussein bin Ghaanim al-Qahtani, a businessman; Mr Muhammad bin Naser al-Ghamidi, a political activist, and Dr. Waleed bin Muhammad Abdullah al-Majid, a lawyer. The detention of these individuals was fueled by the fact that the party had amassed a big following using the media. Its growing influenced threatened the government which is keen on restricting opposition. The actions of the state succeeded in disabling the activities of the party for a while. However, by this time, the Islamic Umma Party had managed to capture the attention of a lot of the people in Saudi Arabia and outside the country. The party’s influence of the people made it a strong opposition organization in the country (Alsalem 2011). It was not just merely existing but also making a difference in terms of political opinions.      

Movement of Islamic Reform in Arabia, MIRA

        Robert Ryan writes an account of the MIRA opposition from its inception to the year 2005. This opposition movement was started in the early 1990s by Sa‘ad al-Faqih. Faqih was one of the founding members of another radical group, the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR). When CDLR relocated to London in 1993, he formed MIRA as an opposition movement against the regime in Saudi Arabia. The opposition movement claimed to be running in accordance with the sharia laws. After September 11, 2001, Faqih attracted the attention of the media and publicly condemned the Al-Saud family for various reasons including their exercise of power in Saudi Arabia. He claimed only to support peaceful means of resolving conflict (Ryan 2005).

The movement has a strong horizontal but weak vertical structure. It is a single person organization since it was formed by Faqih alone. This makes it very weak and is bound to disappear once its leader is disappeared — the movement aimed at removing the Al-Saud family from power using peaceful means. Faqih was an expatriate and this limited the ways through which the Saudi government would capture and imprison him. The movement was also based in London and utilized technology to reach its supporters. Ryan argues that Faqih and the movement were not as effective as they were unable to inspire any kind of reform. In 2004, Faqih called for demonstrations, but the turnout was low since public protesting is outlawed in Saudi Arabia. On the day of the protests, the government increased security troops on the streets to prevent the assembly of people and direct traffic. The other reason why there were very few people willing to take part in the demonstrations was that they did not know what they were protesting against. When Faqih called for the protests, he only told his followers to demand reforms. The movement was linked to terrorist groups. In 2004, Faqih was put on the list of al-Qaeda operatives by the United Nations Security Council (Ryan 2005) .

Tajdeed Islamic Party (Islamic Renewal party).

          The Tajdeed Islamic Party was formed in London. Its focus is on the jurisprudence issues that affect Muslim. It supports the “freedom of thought and believes in dialogue based on argument and evidence” (About the Ideology of Party of Islamic Renewal). This is a radical Islamist group that believes in fulfilling their duties at any cost. The growth of the influence of the group is curtailed by both the Saudi government and the Western world.

Ghanem Almasarir

Ghanem Almasarir is a Saudi human rights activist and a well-liked political comedian who is based in London. He is a known political satirist popular for hosting the Ghanem Show that features many popular sections such as “Fadfada.” The show involves criticism of the royal family using black comedy. As an individual opposition, he is very effective in reaching the people. He has a very good media presence and has over half a million followers on tweeter and more on the other social media platforms. The work he does not only sensitizes the world on what is happening in Saudi Arabia but also provides an alternative to the use of violence and threats in the fight against an oppressive regime. The show and the other video clips he publishes on websites and on YouTube reaches thousands of people. His YouTube channel and tweets are readily available to the public. The fact that he can reach a lot of people makes Ghanem one of the most effective opposition. The use of social media improves his chances of reaching the young generation.

Almasarir had been in self-imposed exile since 2003 in London, where he controlled his YouTube-based show from 2015. In his show, he condemns the Saudi royal family, whom he tags as “Salmanco” (relating to the techniques used by the King in controlling the nation in a fashion comparable to a business or as private possession) and “al-Dub al-Dasher” (means fat stray bear) correspondingly in a funny way. Almasarir accused Saud al-Qahtani, an advisor to the Saudi royal court, of being involved in crimes linked to “visa fraud” in Saudi Arabia.

Oppositions Financial Support

The Royals have not lacked the oppositions, although for a long time the Royals have been capable of containing or coopting them. After the second Gulf War, nevertheless, the socio-religious troubles that have overwhelmed the country have resulted in the development of a small opposition society that has disputed royals’ public image. The oppositions were funded later on by international countries such as Libya, Qatar, and Iran.

It has been recognized and noted that Saudi oppositions receive some financial support from states such as the former Libyan regime, Qatar, and Iran. The late Gaddafi’s regime in Libya offered financial aid to Mohammed Almassari, Saudi’s opposition leader, to assassinate former king Abdullah (Burger & Macleod 2004). Qaddafi termed the Saudis that they can even ally with the devil to save themselves. King Abdullah referred to Gaddafi as a liar and states that his grave awaits him. That was in 2003. In 2009, the two leaders insulted each other again in an Arab League summit. Gaddafi had confirmed supporting the assassination attacks on the Saudi King Abdullah. This was to happen in either of the following ways: a personal attack, or by oppositions that would overcome the Royals. Gaddafi planned to interfere and harm the royals and was looking for an opposition who were eager to get involved (Fotopoulos 2011). Al-Massari was the primary suspect of the plan who was charged for the proceedings on colluding for the murder of the late King Abdullah.

Qatar has supported the Saudi Saad Al-Faqih and others to utilize them as instruments to strike the royals. Qatar’s want to respond to the Saudi royals whom supported and planned the 1996 coup against Qatar regime. Qatar preferred to attain that objective by destabilizing UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, by supporting their arch-rival, Iran that is also planning on disrupting order in the Middle East (Almezaini & Rickli 2016).

Al-Faqih and others were paid millions of Qatari Riyals to create and spread falsehoods concerning Saudi royals. Al-Faqih, currently living in London received 395 million Qatari riyals to use in the plan, in any manner, on weaving fictions on Saudi royals (Qatarileaks 2017) . Qatar has established then use Aljazeera channel to sponsor socio-political reforms in the region. Aljazeera channel helped Saudi oppositions to spread their ideas and political projects to stepdown the Saudi royals for a limited period of time. 

Iran had funded Al-Dosari since 2015 when he started his Ghanem show with Iran offering Almasarir free TV studio recording. Ghanem show could freely use the Iran network as a Saudi human rights campaigner and a well-liked political comedian to criticize the Saudi government. This provided a great chance for the Protestants in Saudi to demonstrate and disrupt the government. Ghanem show and the black comedy also gives the opposition a chance to disclose mysteries linked to the royal family and incited demonstrations against the Saudi rule.

Through external funding from Iran and its London organizations arm, Almasarir had led an opposition group referred to as “September 15 Movement.” The protest occurred all over Saudi Arabia in 2017 that has been depicted as convincing a large group of citizens. The protests supported by Almasarir led to a point where the existing crisis with Qatar had authorized gathering so many people protesters like never before that might be the reason for the anxiety of the system towards the demonstrations. London has functioned as an Arab media house. Running away from the bans at home, media personalities find liberty in exile. United Kingdome provided the safest place for Saudi Arabian oppositions. 

Famous clergymen like Salman al-Ouda and Awadh al-Qarni were captured because of being detected as “pro-Doha” and a big following in social media networks that the Saudi regime dreaded would be used to aid protests mandated by Almasarir (Mabon 2018). Frequent leading priests associated with the Saudi like Grand Mufti and Saleh Al Maghamsi have pointed out flaws in Almasarir’s campaign and demanded Saudi people to oppose it.

Al-Sheikh was hosted in MBC show and assured that the advocators for protests for the 15th September campaign were supporters of fraud and sedition “fitna.” He confirmed that they do not have a good intention and that they want to disrupt the government and cause unnecessary civil war, which is promulgated by the rivals of Saudi Arabia. He has accused Almasarir of working with Iran to incite and sponsor the “September 15 Movement”. He also termed demonstrators as the advocates of ignorance “Jahiliyyah” and perverseness. Since late 2017, it was recorded that Almasarir already had about 553,000 followers on Twitter and million viewers on his YouTube-based channel. 

Iran is funding and politicizing the Shia distinctiveness that is intended only to enhance tensions in Saudi Arabia and might even undermine other parts of the Middle East. Iran has long attempted to institute itself as a main, political, economic and cultural competitor in the Middle East by tactically funding the minority Shia in the area. As the leading Shia majority nation in the area, Iran has an interest in offsetting Saudi power through the area and conquering a place as a local power with worldwide accomplishment. As the Sunnis are ruled by functional governments, Iran fights to gain more influence in Iraq than all other interested parties do. Tehran would want to keep Iraq stable but would have to mediate between Shia and Sunni conflict, helping Shia regain its influence in the region but keeping them from being too powerful.

Massive Reforms in Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is known for the history of maintaining the legacy of Islamic conservatism to shape the country’s education and economy. However, with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ascend to power social liberalization has become central to the economic modernization, Islamic tolerance and moderation. For several years, Saudi Arabia has been an oil-dependent economy, and economic liberalization would have a significant economic impact in the country’s future.

According to Stancati (2018) , Saudi Arabia was the only country in the world that had banned women from driving, and it was considered a taboo for women to drive. Music and entertainment were also considered taboo in the country while women were also prohibited from watching soccer or getting involved in sports. However, Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s “Vision 2030” program is intended to transform the country economically, socially and culturally by lifting most of the practices that hold the country back. According to Kubersky (2018) , Saudi Arabia has pledged to use billions of dollars to modernize and overhaul the country’s entertainment sector in a bid to achieve the economic value of the sector. During an ultra-conservative past, the participation of women in public entertainment was unheard, and it was a taboo for women to enter entertainment venues. However, with reforms women are free to participate in all entertainment activities. 

Most of the new reforms are intended to make the Kingdom more progressive in line with moral standards of the West. According to Thompson (2017) , Saudi Arabia under Prince Mohammed bin Salman has entered an unprecedented phase in its history with much of Kingdom’s tight religious policies being eased to alleviate the oppression many Saudis have experienced in the history of the country. Much of the religious policies have been oppressive especially on the part of women since they could not drive or participate in sports or even any kind of entertainments, but with the new reforms, women can enjoy a normal life like other women elsewhere in the world.

Saudi Arabia’s oil industry has been central to most of the benefits that are enjoyed by its citizens including free health care and subsidized housing. However, with the declining global oil prices, Mohammed bin Salman perceives that privatizing certain sectors such as the national oil industry would help diversify the economy an end the Kingdom’s overreliance on oil-economy. According to Ignatius (2018), the new reform plan is intended to make Saudi Arabia into a more entrepreneurial, more modern, less-hidebound and more youth- ­oriented society. Majority of the country’s population is made up of youth, and more than 12% of the labour force is unemployed. Salameh (2016) contends that the new changes will help the country become more attractive to foreign investors and empower the country’s own youth in the facing of growing underground extremist groups and limited opportunities for the youth. The revenue from oil has been declining since the prices of the product plummeted in 2014. A drive to economic diversification will help the country overcome vulnerability that arises from the reliance on oil alone.

Reforms imposed by Prince Mohammed bin Salman prove essential to Saudi Arabia’s alignment with the global social and economic changes. Diversification of the economy is vital to help the country overcome economic challenges in the face of declining fortunes from the oil industry. Changes in the social and cultural welfare of the country are essential since alleviation of rigid religious policies gives women much-needed freedom they deserve.

Hypothesis

This research has developed the below hypothesis to act as a guide when conducting the research.

• Hypothesis: The repression of political opposition by authoritarian Saudi monarchy is not centred on Islamic fundamentalism but the response to radical movements challenging the strength behind the authoritarianism including US imperialism and modernization.

Most of the political opposition parties in Saudi Arabia are concerned about the increased US imperialism and secularization of the society which is against the Islamic fundamentalism which is the source of the countries national pride. The hard stance taken by the monarch against political activities in the country is influenced by the desire to maintain the strengthening forces behind the authoritarian government which are the US imperialism and oil capitalism.

The US and other foreign forces have been a significant role in supporting the Saudi Arabia monarch to crush the slightest political opposition be it peaceful, conservative or radical.  In the aftermath of radicalization that led to the infamous 9/11 terrorist attack in America, the Western forces including the US and UK have supported the monarchy in a large to repress any political opposition using any means possible.  While the legitimacy of the authoritarian government is supported by the clerics, who have been the force behind the conservative religion that is the central to national unity, increased US imperialism has made the monarch to drift away from the Islamic Sharia laws that are fundamental Islamic religion.  The democratic space in the country has been repressed to impede the political opposition a chance to thrive in the country. In the aftermath of the Arab spring, the monarch employed harsh measures intended to crush the slightest form of opposition in the country.

Research Objectives

The primary aim of this research is to explore which factors affect the success of the Saudi Arabia opposition parties in light of authoritarian monarch government that uses all forms of powers to outlaw political opposition in the country.  The study will explore how a wide range of factors empower or disempowers the political opposition in the country.

Objectives

1. To determine how the political opposition thrive in the face of authoritarian government.
2. To establish western influence in Saudi Arabia affects the success of the opposition political parties.
3. Determine whether international financial supports the success of political opposition in Saudi Arabia.
4. To determine how lack of democracy hinders political opposition activities in Saudi Arabia.
5. Establish how monarch has learned how best to deal with opposition groups since the Arab Spring.

Research Questions

Research questions help in providing the direction that the research will take. This particular research will use the following research questions

1. To what extent does lack of democracy affect political opposition, Saudi Arabia?
2. How has the Arab Spring affected success or failure of political opposition in Saudi Arabia?
3. How have Western countries affected political opposition in Saudi Arabia?
4. Which is the main factor that affects the success of the Saudi Arabia political opposition?
5. How is international financial support shaping the future of political opposition in Saudi Arabia?
6. What are the achievements of political opposition parties in Saudi Arabia?

The following chapter presents the methodology of the main study in order to examine the research questions.

CHAPTER THREE

Methodology

The study employed a qualitative content analysis approach.  The study extracted data for specific variables of interest including a year of publication, type of publication and availability of the content. The study selected freely available information on the internet which included publications by major digital newspapers, print, websites and scholarly articles. The study employed a systematic coding approach to code a large volume of text to identify to identify patterns or themes and meanings from the texts. The coding approach was developed based on the conventional qualitative content analysis approach. A systematic generation of theory (The Theory of Saudi Arabia Political Opposition) was used to develop codes directly from the texts.  

The code names developed in the study included

1. Attitude from the West
2. Democracy
3. Constitutional monarchy
4. International financial support
5. Political openness
6. Historical hostility among opposition’s groups
7. Saudi authority suppressing for each group since the Arab Spring

Analysis

While the Saudi Arabia monarchy regime prohibits formation of political opposition outfit in the Kingdom, a number of political parties including The Islamic Umma Party, Movement of Islamic Reform in Arabia, MIRA, Tajdeed Islamic Party (Islamic Renewal party) and Ghanem Almasarir have been formed in protest to a wide range of issues they do not agree with in the monarch. However, the political outfits have experienced a mix of failures and success in the light of the authoritarian government for a wide range of factors.

Suppression by Saudi Authority after the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring played a significant role in influencing regime change in large part of the Arab World including countries such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Bahrain.Saudi Arabia remained untouched by the Arab Spring by employing successful counterrevolutionary mechanisms. However, the Arab Spring played a vital role in promoting the formation of political opposition in the Kingdom that had experienced limited political opposition activities for several decades (Mabon 2012). The Umma Islamic Party is one of the parties whose position was predominantly influenced by the Arab Spring in 2011. It is regarded as the first opposition political party in Saudi Arabia since it was the first to defy the order that forbade the existence of political parties in Saudi Arabia. Party came into being after nine Saudi scholars, and political activists came together to fight for political reforms. The party was made public on February 9^th, 2011. Unlike other organizations that came before and after it, it had a very organized structure with leaders and a well spelled out (Alsalem 2011) . In light of the  Arab Spring that was informed by the need to bring an end to the Authoritarian Regimes in most of the Arab States, The Umma Islamic Party also wanted an end to the authoritarian Saudi monarch regime. The Arab Spring had succeeded in toppling oppressive regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain and it played a significant role to buttress formation of the first political movement in the Saudi Arabia soil. All the other political movements were operating outside Saudi Arabia including the Movement of Islamic Reform in Arabia, MIRA and Tajdeed Islamic Party (Islamic Renewal party) which are based in U.K.

Since early 2011 the monarch has taken stern action against Islamist and liberal critics without clear reasons behind the arrests and other measures taken by the government. Open criticism of prominent princes or the ruling family as a whole and overt challenges to the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam predominant in the country drew particularly harsh responses (Mabon 2012). The Islamic Umma Party (Hizb al-Umma al-Islami) which formed a political opposition in the state despite being banned by the monarch government experienced the wrath of the government (Bsheer 2018). The Saudi ruling family assumed that the Islamic Umma Party (Hizb al-Umma al-Islami) wanted to topple their regime despite the party having moderate demands. The founding members of the Islamic Umma Party were arrested but later released on the condition that they would refrain from any form of political activities in the future. Any activist or individual who made any form of provocative demands in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring faced heightened state repression liberal activists such as Muhammad al-Qahtani and Abdallah al-Hamid.

Democracy and Constitutional Monarchy

The Saudi monarch government employs authoritarianism which comprises of a ban on political action, frequent resort to police violence, opacity, and disinformation. Use of excessive power to crack down dissidents through waves of arrests and imprisonments has impacted negatively on political opposition in Saudi Arabia (Matthiesen 2012). Additionally, there is the use of specialized Criminal Courts that use the counterterrorism regulations to repress pro-reform activists and peaceful dissidents. A sheer criticism of the regime through media interview or social media warrants arrest and imprisonment. Arbitrary arrest s of political party leaders and activists coupled with systematic violations of due process and fair trial rights have made it hard for the political opposition to thrive in the country (Ménoret 2016). The authorities detain arrested suspects for months, even years, without judicial review or prosecution with the sole intention of crapping down any form of political opposition. The intellectuals behind the formation of the Umma Party were arrested following the formation of the party. Other party leaders including those of the Movement of Islamic Reform in Arabia, MIRA and Tajdeed Islamic Party (Islamic Renewal party) had to operate from U.K in fear of being arrested and lack of democracy in Saudi Arabia. Ghanem Almasarir, one of the major activists and critics of the Saudi Royal family, operates from U.K. for fear of being arrested.

The Western Attitude

The Al Saud have consolidated their grip on power, against popular protest and unrest, with the aid of the U.S. oil company Aramco and of international security cooperation. In the past decades, the Saudi state has benefited from the French, British, and U.S. input in the design of a brutal repression machine. All the opposition parties in Saudi Arabia are against the Western Imperialism adopted by the royal family in governing the country.  The increased involvement of the Western Powers such as the U.S.A, U.K., France and Germany in the affairs of Kingdom has led to increased modernization which is interpreted as the secularization of the society and western imperialism by the opposition parties (Madawi 2015). In the aftermath of the terror attack on the American soil in 9/11, the American government supported the Saudi Arabia government in the fight against terrorism with the intention of suppressing any form of radicalization in the country. Consequently, the Suadi Arabia government adopted the 2014 terror laws extended the definition of terrorism to cover the peaceful protest, political speech, and organized action (Rosie 2012). The kingdom now has full power to crush any protest or criticism, no matter how peaceful or constructive it may be. Ultimately, the Saudi Arabia opposition today is organized principally on Islamist foundation which is the sense of national pride (Beranek 2009). However, the support of the western powers Saudi Arabia has been able to crush every form on the opposition in the country making opposition activities hard to thrive.

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THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION UNDER INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORTERS

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Saudi Arabia is one of the most religious states in the world which has successfully combined the state (dawla), religion (din), and princes (umara) (Teitelbaum & Pipes 2001). The country has thrived on the arrangement between the royals and the religious clerics. The Al-Saud royal family provides funding and a stable structure of government which allowed the growth of a conservative religion throughout the nation, while the clerics provided the government with the religious legitimacy to rule (Teitelbaum & Pipes 2001) . The arrangement made it possible to have an authoritarian regime that uses the nation’s wealth to the favour of only the royal family. Clerics legalize all action made by the authoritarian regime even though unjustified. Arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearance were legalized by clerics as the Royals’ right to protect citizens which completely contradict with Islamic teaching. Detaining thousands of people for more than six months, in some cases for over a decade, without referring them to courts for criminal proceedings (Justice 2008) . Arbitrary detainees held for very long periods has obviously increased dramatically in recent years. Cleric Salman AlOudah has been detained since 1^st September 2017 without a legal charge or indictment and was not brought to the court. It was not only the Islamists who were exposed to such violations but the intellectuals and human rights activists. The clerics were free to enforce Sharia in the country, and the Royals were free to run the wealth and affairs of the country. However, as the Saudi state grew and started embracing modernism, some changes were made, and this revealed subordination of clergy to the Royals at the expense of religion. The Royals welcomed some western ways, and this foreign influence should be rejected by the clerics (Kostiner 1996) . The royal family now is fully controlling the clerics. Conflicts arose as a result of this modernization of the country in that; the clerics support the reforms implemented by the state. Accordingly, official religious establishment became part of the government and worked in line with. The royal family wanted a more centralized system of government while citizens keen to huge reform away from the authoritarian regime.

Security grip is a royal way to keep interests and stay in power. It is impossible to talk about pluralism nor political participation as that can be conceded as disobedience of the royals and Islam teaching.  In the meantime, all opposition forces are calling for democracy, pluralism and political participation. Citizens are also seeking change not calling for dropping the royals but by calling for constitutional monarchy. Citizens and opposition forces believe in the political reform which obviously unacceptable to the Royals. Therefore, citizens’ perceptions are important for more understanding the needed reform. 

Saudi Arabia government approved a huge shift when prince Mohammed Bin Salman appointed as crown prince on June 21, 2017 (Barnell 2017). The new crown prince has made a number of exciting reforms, such allowing women to drive, opening cinema halls and performing concerts. Unfortunately, political reforms were not part of the crown prince’s plan. Furthermore, the crown prince has embarrassed the Wahhabi religious establishment as all his reforms contradict their approach. 

Crown prince Mohammed Bin Salman stated that Saudi authority adopted Wahhabism as requested by western states to stop the Communist expansion in the late 1970s (DeYoung 2018). The statement can be considered as a coup against the religious establishment which has been silent. Opposition forces welcomed the statement as it removes the authority religious legitimacy that violates rights and confiscates freedoms.  

CHAPTER TWO

Literature

The opposition in Saudi Arabia can be traced back to the early 1930s. Prior to this period, the Islamic rules were practised in accordance with the Wahhabi creed. These principles laid the basis of the Saudi expansion as an enforcer of the sharia law. The laws were used as a moral compass to guide the actions of the citizens. After the establishment of a state that was more centralized than decentralized, individuals and groups resisted the control from the state. A dispute later arose between Abd al- ‘Aziz Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman (Ibn Sa’ud), the Saudi leader at that time, and a number of tribal groups, the Ikhwan, who were loyal to the religion and resisted being under the control of the government. Fierce disagreements arose between the leading clerics and the royals. In the 1930s, the king, Ibn Sa’ud made the Wahhabi Islam the official state religion. Only the senior clerics had supreme religious authority. This meant that all the other clerics could only conduct their affairs within the religious framework put in place by the king. He also made state interest superior to the religious interests (Matthiesen 2015) .

The Wahhabi Islam became the only moral guide in the state. However, they were only allowed to operate in accordance with the interests of the state. The clerics were limited to guiding the behaviour of the public, educating individuals, and preaching. They could not take part in governing the state. The state was run by the royals and the elite clerics. The Ikhwan tribal groups which opposed the king’s control over the people lost the battle in between 1929 and 1930 after a military help from Great Britain to King Abdulaziz. They were not able to spread their ideologies. They remained underground, and their ideas were adopted by various other opposition movements over time. The opposition in Saudi Arabia came to be as a result of people resisting change and state control (Meijer, Aarts, Wagemakers, & Kanie 2012) .

After the Second Gulf War, the opposition continued to grow. The opposition groups and individuals in this era had slightly different grievances. When the Saudi military was unable to defend the country, and the U.S military troops were called in to help, most of the people criticized the state. The royal family was seen as weak and incompetent leaders. The opposition groups that developed in this period were determined to end the reign of the royal family. There was a public outcry when the non-Muslim troops came into the country. The presence of the foreign troops in the state led to the opinion that the royal family held foreign interests in high esteem. The opposition criticized the royals as being keener on protecting the interests of outsiders (Teitelbaum & Pipes 2001) .

In the years 1991-2001, the activities of the opposition were restricted by the state. Outspoken individuals who challenged the royals were imprisoned or detained without a trial (Teitelbaum & Pipes 2001). The opposition groups such as the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia started operating outside Saudi Arabia to avoid being persecuted. Most of the opposition leaders used London as a base of operations. They were able to reach their supporters through the internet and the media without facing any repression from the royal family.  The grievances and issues addressed were the same throughout the 1990s. Both the radicals and the liberals agreed on the issue of foreign interference (Jenkinsc 2017) .

Their oppositions have grown ever since despite the constant repression from the Saudi government. The opposition in Saudi Arabia is similar to other movements in the Middle East except for the fact that the Saudi opposition derives from the Wahhabi school of thought in that, they have their interpretation of the Sharia that they use to challenge state control as being unlawful. Some of the religious ideologies of the modern opposition and activism correspond with some of the ideas from the West, and as a result, they can influence the modern middle-class individuals (Matthiesen 2015) explain the assertion – democracy- pluralism- human rights principles. The Saudi oppositions accept and call for democracy, political participation, and pluralism that denied by Wahhabism. It is easier for them to influence the educated people since they purport to seek to address a modern issue such as corruption, human rights violations, among other things. Even though some of the oppositions have clear objective sand structures, they are at risk or becoming ineffective due to the measures were taken by the Saudi government and other interested parties in repressing opposition. This means that even though most of these oppositions exist and have a lot of influence, their activities are quashed even before they become established. 

The Theory of Saudi Arabia Political Opposition

All political oppositions fighting the authoritarian regime and call for democracy but under Islamic rules (sharia law).  It is common for the opposition parties in Saudi Arabia to uses the language of Islamic laws, to accuse the government of breaching the holy law by neglecting Islamic goals and deviating from Islamic practices in the administrative, economic and political affairs. The opposition party also suggests alternatives to the existing government based on the Islamic Sharia laws. The radical Islamic opposition movement such as the Tajdeed Islamic Party (Islamic Renewal party) questions theexisting state order by giving its own interpretation of Wahhabi Islam.

Liberalism enjoys a global victory in some sense, and it is perceived to perpetuate the ideals of political liberties or free trade to maximize individual freedom best. However, the opposition in Saudi Arabia believes in liberalism but under Islamic rules (not pure liberalism). The opposition in the country does not advocate a strictly secular state. The opposition is against a West’s spiritually vacant secular culture but instead want a liberal democracy’s based on divine authority. While the opposition supports most of the liberal democracies including popular elections and economic modernization, God’s sovereignty is central to the opposition politicians. The political opposition tends to align their politics with a righteous society with the precepts of shari’a; spiritualism rationalized in the technocratic ways they use to rise against the government and its absolute authority.
While the Political oppositions call for Pluralism as they believe in the need for political parties and institutions of civil society, but they support the activities of the groups should be based on their interpretation of the Islamic law.  Interpretation of the Islamic law differs from one group to another, but that does not change the nature of the liberalism they want to see in the country.

The Islamic Umma Party.

          The Islamic Umma Party is regarded as the first opposition political party in Saudi Arabia. It had defied the order that forbade the existence of political parties in Saudi Arabia. The party came into being after nine Saudi scholars, and political activists came together to fight for political reforms. The party was made public on February 9^th, 2011. Unlike other organizations that came before and after it, it had a very organized structure with leaders and a well spelled out (Alsalem 2011) .

            After the party was formed, the officials of the party made invitations to activists who shared the same opinions to join them. As a result of this announcement, the founding members of the party were arrested and detained on 16^th February that same year. The detainees included; Dr Ahmed bin Sa’ad bin Gharm al-Ghamidi who was a professor at Umm al-Qura University, Mr Sa’ud bin Ahmed al-Dughaithir a political activist, Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin Muhammad al-Wuhaybi; a lawyer and political activist; Dr Abdul Kareem bin Yusuf al-Khidhr who was a university professor, Shaykh Muhammad bin Hussein bin Ghaanim al-Qahtani, a businessman; Mr Muhammad bin Naser al-Ghamidi, a political activist, and Dr. Waleed bin Muhammad Abdullah al-Majid, a lawyer. The detention of these individuals was fueled by the fact that the party had amassed a big following using the media. Its growing influenced threatened the government which is keen on restricting opposition. The actions of the state succeeded in disabling the activities of the party for a while. However, by this time, the Islamic Umma Party had managed to capture the attention of a lot of the people in Saudi Arabia and outside the country. The party’s influence of the people made it a strong opposition organization in the country (Alsalem 2011). It was not just merely existing but also making a difference in terms of political opinions.      

Movement of Islamic Reform in Arabia, MIRA

        Robert Ryan writes an account of the MIRA opposition from its inception to the year 2005. This opposition movement was started in the early 1990s by Sa‘ad al-Faqih. Faqih was one of the founding members of another radical group, the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR). When CDLR relocated to London in 1993, he formed MIRA as an opposition movement against the regime in Saudi Arabia. The opposition movement claimed to be running in accordance with the sharia laws. After September 11, 2001, Faqih attracted the attention of the media and publicly condemned the Al-Saud family for various reasons including their exercise of power in Saudi Arabia. He claimed only to support peaceful means of resolving conflict (Ryan 2005).

The movement has a strong horizontal but weak vertical structure. It is a single person organization since it was formed by Faqih alone. This makes it very weak and is bound to disappear once its leader is disappeared — the movement aimed at removing the Al-Saud family from power using peaceful means. Faqih was an expatriate and this limited the ways through which the Saudi government would capture and imprison him. The movement was also based in London and utilized technology to reach its supporters. Ryan argues that Faqih and the movement were not as effective as they were unable to inspire any kind of reform. In 2004, Faqih called for demonstrations, but the turnout was low since public protesting is outlawed in Saudi Arabia. On the day of the protests, the government increased security troops on the streets to prevent the assembly of people and direct traffic. The other reason why there were very few people willing to take part in the demonstrations was that they did not know what they were protesting against. When Faqih called for the protests, he only told his followers to demand reforms. The movement was linked to terrorist groups. In 2004, Faqih was put on the list of al-Qaeda operatives by the United Nations Security Council (Ryan 2005) .

Tajdeed Islamic Party (Islamic Renewal party).

          The Tajdeed Islamic Party was formed in London. Its focus is on the jurisprudence issues that affect Muslim. It supports the “freedom of thought and believes in dialogue based on argument and evidence” (About the Ideology of Party of Islamic Renewal). This is a radical Islamist group that believes in fulfilling their duties at any cost. The growth of the influence of the group is curtailed by both the Saudi government and the Western world.

Ghanem Almasarir

Ghanem Almasarir is a Saudi human rights activist and a well-liked political comedian who is based in London. He is a known political satirist popular for hosting the Ghanem Show that features many popular sections such as “Fadfada.” The show involves criticism of the royal family using black comedy. As an individual opposition, he is very effective in reaching the people. He has a very good media presence and has over half a million followers on tweeter and more on the other social media platforms. The work he does not only sensitizes the world on what is happening in Saudi Arabia but also provides an alternative to the use of violence and threats in the fight against an oppressive regime. The show and the other video clips he publishes on websites and on YouTube reaches thousands of people. His YouTube channel and tweets are readily available to the public. The fact that he can reach a lot of people makes Ghanem one of the most effective opposition. The use of social media improves his chances of reaching the young generation.

Almasarir had been in self-imposed exile since 2003 in London, where he controlled his YouTube-based show from 2015. In his show, he condemns the Saudi royal family, whom he tags as “Salmanco” (relating to the techniques used by the King in controlling the nation in a fashion comparable to a business or as private possession) and “al-Dub al-Dasher” (means fat stray bear) correspondingly in a funny way. Almasarir accused Saud al-Qahtani, an advisor to the Saudi royal court, of being involved in crimes linked to “visa fraud” in Saudi Arabia.

Oppositions Financial Support

The Royals have not lacked the oppositions, although for a long time the Royals have been capable of containing or coopting them. After the second Gulf War, nevertheless, the socio-religious troubles that have overwhelmed the country have resulted in the development of a small opposition society that has disputed royals’ public image. The oppositions were funded later on by international countries such as Libya, Qatar, and Iran.

It has been recognized and noted that Saudi oppositions receive some financial support from states such as the former Libyan regime, Qatar, and Iran. The late Gaddafi’s regime in Libya offered financial aid to Mohammed Almassari, Saudi’s opposition leader, to assassinate former king Abdullah (Burger & Macleod 2004). Qaddafi termed the Saudis that they can even ally with the devil to save themselves. King Abdullah referred to Gaddafi as a liar and states that his grave awaits him. That was in 2003. In 2009, the two leaders insulted each other again in an Arab League summit. Gaddafi had confirmed supporting the assassination attacks on the Saudi King Abdullah. This was to happen in either of the following ways: a personal attack, or by oppositions that would overcome the Royals. Gaddafi planned to interfere and harm the royals and was looking for an opposition who were eager to get involved (Fotopoulos 2011). Al-Massari was the primary suspect of the plan who was charged for the proceedings on colluding for the murder of the late King Abdullah.

Qatar has supported the Saudi Saad Al-Faqih and others to utilize them as instruments to strike the royals. Qatar’s want to respond to the Saudi royals whom supported and planned the 1996 coup against Qatar regime. Qatar preferred to attain that objective by destabilizing UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, by supporting their arch-rival, Iran that is also planning on disrupting order in the Middle East (Almezaini & Rickli 2016).

Al-Faqih and others were paid millions of Qatari Riyals to create and spread falsehoods concerning Saudi royals. Al-Faqih, currently living in London received 395 million Qatari riyals to use in the plan, in any manner, on weaving fictions on Saudi royals (Qatarileaks 2017) . Qatar has established then use Aljazeera channel to sponsor socio-political reforms in the region. Aljazeera channel helped Saudi oppositions to spread their ideas and political projects to stepdown the Saudi royals for a limited period of time. 

Iran had funded Al-Dosari since 2015 when he started his Ghanem show with Iran offering Almasarir free TV studio recording. Ghanem show could freely use the Iran network as a Saudi human rights campaigner and a well-liked political comedian to criticize the Saudi government. This provided a great chance for the Protestants in Saudi to demonstrate and disrupt the government. Ghanem show and the black comedy also gives the opposition a chance to disclose mysteries linked to the royal family and incited demonstrations against the Saudi rule.

Through external funding from Iran and its London organizations arm, Almasarir had led an opposition group referred to as “September 15 Movement.” The protest occurred all over Saudi Arabia in 2017 that has been depicted as convincing a large group of citizens. The protests supported by Almasarir led to a point where the existing crisis with Qatar had authorized gathering so many people protesters like never before that might be the reason for the anxiety of the system towards the demonstrations. London has functioned as an Arab media house. Running away from the bans at home, media personalities find liberty in exile. United Kingdome provided the safest place for Saudi Arabian oppositions. 

Famous clergymen like Salman al-Ouda and Awadh al-Qarni were captured because of being detected as “pro-Doha” and a big following in social media networks that the Saudi regime dreaded would be used to aid protests mandated by Almasarir (Mabon 2018). Frequent leading priests associated with the Saudi like Grand Mufti and Saleh Al Maghamsi have pointed out flaws in Almasarir’s campaign and demanded Saudi people to oppose it.

Al-Sheikh was hosted in MBC show and assured that the advocators for protests for the 15th September campaign were supporters of fraud and sedition “fitna.” He confirmed that they do not have a good intention and that they want to disrupt the government and cause unnecessary civil war, which is promulgated by the rivals of Saudi Arabia. He has accused Almasarir of working with Iran to incite and sponsor the “September 15 Movement”. He also termed demonstrators as the advocates of ignorance “Jahiliyyah” and perverseness. Since late 2017, it was recorded that Almasarir already had about 553,000 followers on Twitter and million viewers on his YouTube-based channel. 

Iran is funding and politicizing the Shia distinctiveness that is intended only to enhance tensions in Saudi Arabia and might even undermine other parts of the Middle East. Iran has long attempted to institute itself as a main, political, economic and cultural competitor in the Middle East by tactically funding the minority Shia in the area. As the leading Shia majority nation in the area, Iran has an interest in offsetting Saudi power through the area and conquering a place as a local power with worldwide accomplishment. As the Sunnis are ruled by functional governments, Iran fights to gain more influence in Iraq than all other interested parties do. Tehran would want to keep Iraq stable but would have to mediate between Shia and Sunni conflict, helping Shia regain its influence in the region but keeping them from being too powerful.

Massive Reforms in Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is known for the history of maintaining the legacy of Islamic conservatism to shape the country’s education and economy. However, with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ascend to power social liberalization has become central to the economic modernization, Islamic tolerance and moderation. For several years, Saudi Arabia has been an oil-dependent economy, and economic liberalization would have a significant economic impact in the country’s future.

According to Stancati (2018) , Saudi Arabia was the only country in the world that had banned women from driving, and it was considered a taboo for women to drive. Music and entertainment were also considered taboo in the country while women were also prohibited from watching soccer or getting involved in sports. However, Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s “Vision 2030” program is intended to transform the country economically, socially and culturally by lifting most of the practices that hold the country back. According to Kubersky (2018) , Saudi Arabia has pledged to use billions of dollars to modernize and overhaul the country’s entertainment sector in a bid to achieve the economic value of the sector. During an ultra-conservative past, the participation of women in public entertainment was unheard, and it was a taboo for women to enter entertainment venues. However, with reforms women are free to participate in all entertainment activities. 

Most of the new reforms are intended to make the Kingdom more progressive in line with moral standards of the West. According to Thompson (2017) , Saudi Arabia under Prince Mohammed bin Salman has entered an unprecedented phase in its history with much of Kingdom’s tight religious policies being eased to alleviate the oppression many Saudis have experienced in the history of the country. Much of the religious policies have been oppressive especially on the part of women since they could not drive or participate in sports or even any kind of entertainments, but with the new reforms, women can enjoy a normal life like other women elsewhere in the world.

Saudi Arabia’s oil industry has been central to most of the benefits that are enjoyed by its citizens including free health care and subsidized housing. However, with the declining global oil prices, Mohammed bin Salman perceives that privatizing certain sectors such as the national oil industry would help diversify the economy an end the Kingdom’s overreliance on oil-economy. According to Ignatius (2018), the new reform plan is intended to make Saudi Arabia into a more entrepreneurial, more modern, less-hidebound and more youth- ­oriented society. Majority of the country’s population is made up of youth, and more than 12% of the labour force is unemployed. Salameh (2016) contends that the new changes will help the country become more attractive to foreign investors and empower the country’s own youth in the facing of growing underground extremist groups and limited opportunities for the youth. The revenue from oil has been declining since the prices of the product plummeted in 2014. A drive to economic diversification will help the country overcome vulnerability that arises from the reliance on oil alone.

Reforms imposed by Prince Mohammed bin Salman prove essential to Saudi Arabia’s alignment with the global social and economic changes. Diversification of the economy is vital to help the country overcome economic challenges in the face of declining fortunes from the oil industry. Changes in the social and cultural welfare of the country are essential since alleviation of rigid religious policies gives women much-needed freedom they deserve.

Hypothesis

This research has developed the below hypothesis to act as a guide when conducting the research.

• Hypothesis: The repression of political opposition by authoritarian Saudi monarchy is not centred on Islamic fundamentalism but the response to radical movements challenging the strength behind the authoritarianism including US imperialism and modernization.

Most of the political opposition parties in Saudi Arabia are concerned about the increased US imperialism and secularization of the society which is against the Islamic fundamentalism which is the source of the countries national pride. The hard stance taken by the monarch against political activities in the country is influenced by the desire to maintain the strengthening forces behind the authoritarian government which are the US imperialism and oil capitalism.

The US and other foreign forces have been a significant role in supporting the Saudi Arabia monarch to crush the slightest political opposition be it peaceful, conservative or radical.  In the aftermath of radicalization that led to the infamous 9/11 terrorist attack in America, the Western forces including the US and UK have supported the monarchy in a large to repress any political opposition using any means possible.  While the legitimacy of the authoritarian government is supported by the clerics, who have been the force behind the conservative religion that is the central to national unity, increased US imperialism has made the monarch to drift away from the Islamic Sharia laws that are fundamental Islamic religion.  The democratic space in the country has been repressed to impede the political opposition a chance to thrive in the country. In the aftermath of the Arab spring, the monarch employed harsh measures intended to crush the slightest form of opposition in the country.

Research Objectives

The primary aim of this research is to explore which factors affect the success of the Saudi Arabia opposition parties in light of authoritarian monarch government that uses all forms of powers to outlaw political opposition in the country.  The study will explore how a wide range of factors empower or disempowers the political opposition in the country.

Objectives

1. To determine how the political opposition thrive in the face of authoritarian government.
2. To establish western influence in Saudi Arabia affects the success of the opposition political parties.
3. Determine whether international financial supports the success of political opposition in Saudi Arabia.
4. To determine how lack of democracy hinders political opposition activities in Saudi Arabia.
5. Establish how monarch has learned how best to deal with opposition groups since the Arab Spring.

Research Questions

Research questions help in providing the direction that the research will take. This particular research will use the following research questions

1. To what extent does lack of democracy affect political opposition, Saudi Arabia?
2. How has the Arab Spring affected success or failure of political opposition in Saudi Arabia?
3. How have Western countries affected political opposition in Saudi Arabia?
4. Which is the main factor that affects the success of the Saudi Arabia political opposition?
5. How is international financial support shaping the future of political opposition in Saudi Arabia?
6. What are the achievements of political opposition parties in Saudi Arabia?

The following chapter presents the methodology of the main study in order to examine the research questions.

CHAPTER THREE

Methodology

The study employed a qualitative content analysis approach.  The study extracted data for specific variables of interest including a year of publication, type of publication and availability of the content. The study selected freely available information on the internet which included publications by major digital newspapers, print, websites and scholarly articles. The study employed a systematic coding approach to code a large volume of text to identify to identify patterns or themes and meanings from the texts. The coding approach was developed based on the conventional qualitative content analysis approach. A systematic generation of theory (The Theory of Saudi Arabia Political Opposition) was used to develop codes directly from the texts.  

The code names developed in the study included

1. Attitude from the West
2. Democracy
3. Constitutional monarchy
4. International financial support
5. Political openness
6. Historical hostility among opposition’s groups
7. Saudi authority suppressing for each group since the Arab Spring

Analysis

While the Saudi Arabia monarchy regime prohibits formation of political opposition outfit in the Kingdom, a number of political parties including The Islamic Umma Party, Movement of Islamic Reform in Arabia, MIRA, Tajdeed Islamic Party (Islamic Renewal party) and Ghanem Almasarir have been formed in protest to a wide range of issues they do not agree with in the monarch. However, the political outfits have experienced a mix of failures and success in the light of the authoritarian government for a wide range of factors.

Suppression by Saudi Authority after the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring played a significant role in influencing regime change in large part of the Arab World including countries such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Bahrain.Saudi Arabia remained untouched by the Arab Spring by employing successful counterrevolutionary mechanisms. However, the Arab Spring played a vital role in promoting the formation of political opposition in the Kingdom that had experienced limited political opposition activities for several decades (Mabon 2012). The Umma Islamic Party is one of the parties whose position was predominantly influenced by the Arab Spring in 2011. It is regarded as the first opposition political party in Saudi Arabia since it was the first to defy the order that forbade the existence of political parties in Saudi Arabia. Party came into being after nine Saudi scholars, and political activists came together to fight for political reforms. The party was made public on February 9^th, 2011. Unlike other organizations that came before and after it, it had a very organized structure with leaders and a well spelled out (Alsalem 2011) . In light of the  Arab Spring that was informed by the need to bring an end to the Authoritarian Regimes in most of the Arab States, The Umma Islamic Party also wanted an end to the authoritarian Saudi monarch regime. The Arab Spring had succeeded in toppling oppressive regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain and it played a significant role to buttress formation of the first political movement in the Saudi Arabia soil. All the other political movements were operating outside Saudi Arabia including the Movement of Islamic Reform in Arabia, MIRA and Tajdeed Islamic Party (Islamic Renewal party) which are based in U.K.

Since early 2011 the monarch has taken stern action against Islamist and liberal critics without clear reasons behind the arrests and other measures taken by the government. Open criticism of prominent princes or the ruling family as a whole and overt challenges to the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam predominant in the country drew particularly harsh responses (Mabon 2012). The Islamic Umma Party (Hizb al-Umma al-Islami) which formed a political opposition in the state despite being banned by the monarch government experienced the wrath of the government (Bsheer 2018). The Saudi ruling family assumed that the Islamic Umma Party (Hizb al-Umma al-Islami) wanted to topple their regime despite the party having moderate demands. The founding members of the Islamic Umma Party were arrested but later released on the condition that they would refrain from any form of political activities in the future. Any activist or individual who made any form of provocative demands in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring faced heightened state repression liberal activists such as Muhammad al-Qahtani and Abdallah al-Hamid.

Democracy and Constitutional Monarchy

The Saudi monarch government employs authoritarianism which comprises of a ban on political action, frequent resort to police violence, opacity, and disinformation. Use of excessive power to crack down dissidents through waves of arrests and imprisonments has impacted negatively on political opposition in Saudi Arabia (Matthiesen 2012). Additionally, there is the use of specialized Criminal Courts that use the counterterrorism regulations to repress pro-reform activists and peaceful dissidents. A sheer criticism of the regime through media interview or social media warrants arrest and imprisonment. Arbitrary arrest s of political party leaders and activists coupled with systematic violations of due process and fair trial rights have made it hard for the political opposition to thrive in the country (Ménoret 2016). The authorities detain arrested suspects for months, even years, without judicial review or prosecution with the sole intention of crapping down any form of political opposition. The intellectuals behind the formation of the Umma Party were arrested following the formation of the party. Other party leaders including those of the Movement of Islamic Reform in Arabia, MIRA and Tajdeed Islamic Party (Islamic Renewal party) had to operate from U.K in fear of being arrested and lack of democracy in Saudi Arabia. Ghanem Almasarir, one of the major activists and critics of the Saudi Royal family, operates from U.K. for fear of being arrested.

The Western Attitude

The Al Saud have consolidated their grip on power, against popular protest and unrest, with the aid of the U.S. oil company Aramco and of international security cooperation. In the past decades, the Saudi state has benefited from the French, British, and U.S. input in the design of a brutal repression machine. All the opposition parties in Saudi Arabia are against the Western Imperialism adopted by the royal family in governing the country.  The increased involvement of the Western Powers such as the U.S.A, U.K., France and Germany in the affairs of Kingdom has led to increased modernization which is interpreted as the secularization of the society and western imperialism by the opposition parties (Madawi 2015). In the aftermath of the terror attack on the American soil in 9/11, the American government supported the Saudi Arabia government in the fight against terrorism with the intention of suppressing any form of radicalization in the country. Consequently, the Suadi Arabia government adopted the 2014 terror laws extended the definition of terrorism to cover the peaceful protest, political speech, and organized action (Rosie 2012). The kingdom now has full power to crush any protest or criticism, no matter how peaceful or constructive it may be. Ultimately, the Saudi Arabia opposition today is organized principally on Islamist foundation which is the sense of national pride (Beranek 2009). However, the support of the western powers Saudi Arabia has been able to crush every form on the opposition in the country making opposition activities hard to thrive.

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